


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Some Basic Elements
Affecting



Our Commercial Relations
With Foreign Countries

MATTHEW C. BRUSH 01

Address delivered before the
ALGONQUIN CLUB OF BOSTON

Sunday Morning, Feb. 4, 1923


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As a preface to the more specific part of my talk and that you may understand my personal background for what I shall say, I think it may be useful briefly to tell you my impression of the world situation as it stands today. This sounds ambitious, but the effort shall be very humble and unpretentious.

I shall speak of the Far East, the Near East, Europe, and The Americas, in that order.

The Far East

In my opinion there is nothing upon the horizon in the Far East itself that portends trouble. Of course if difficulties should develop in the Near East so serious that they should threaten a solidification of the non-Christian peoples of the world, the Far East would play an important, perhaps the most

NOTE: Address delivered by Matthew C. Brush, President of American International Corporation, before The Algonquin Club of Boston on Sunday morning, February 4th, 1923.

important part, in the resulting situation. But no such danger appears now, though an aggressive, belligerent, pan-Moslemism may be the goal for which the Turk is striving.

Domestically China seems in the most desperate condition she has seen for a generation at least. As to her finances, she has a central government revenue of 231 thousand dollars Mexican per month, and an expenditure of 9 million dollars Mexican per month, while the money she raised from her last remaining unpledged resource (the Russian Boxer Indemnity) is expended or nearly so. Her domestic credit is gone, also her foreign credit. As to her domestic politics, China is divided into three parts and while no actual fighting is now going on, that may develop at any time. Some look for trouble about February 15th when, by immemorial custom, a Chinese debtor must arrange his debts under the penalty of a loss of "face", that is, loss of financial standing; it is thought the same rule may be applied by the Chinese to their defaulting government. My own *guess* is, for I *know* nothing about the situation, that the Chinese will find some way of distinguishing between personal debts where "face" is lost and government debts where "face" will not be lost.

Moreover, however desperate has seemed the condition of China to the foreigner in the past, it must be said that this great human mass has survived practically unchanged

through the centuries and one is justified in the belief that some way will appear by which China shall become once more a country of peace and prosperity.

Internationally, China politically is perhaps in as good position as she has been since the first half of the last century, by reason of the Washington Conventions. She is in a position where no foreign power is pressing her for territorial or other exceptional privilege, and she seems to stand in no danger from any such aggression.

Japan has recently vacated Shantung in China's favor and if China pays the purchase price for the Shantung Railway—in the neighborhood of \$30,000,000 "Mex."—there does not appear to be anything in the present Chinese situation which would lead to any embroilment with or among the great powers.

There is no apparent untoward situation in or as to Japan. While the Anglo-Japanese alliance still continues, it is to be replaced by the "Four Power Pact" signed at Washington a year ago, so soon as that comes into effect which will occur immediately it is ratified by France. The United States, Great Britain and Japan have already ratified it. This "Four Power Pact" contains a mutual pledge by the parties "to respect" one another's "insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean," and this pledge taken with the non-fortification clause in the Limitation

of Naval Armament Treaty (Article XIX), seems a guarantee of stable conditions in the Far East for an indefinite period in the future.

Moreover, Japan has so far gone forward on the assumption that the treaties and agreements concluded at the Washington Conference would be carried out (though owing to France's failure to ratify they have not yet become effective), and she has also carried out her engagements given at the Conference as to the withdrawal of her troops from Siberia and has surrendered Shantung to China, with whom her present political relations appear no different from China's relations with other powers.

This voluntary observance of obligations not all of which are yet fully perfected and operative, shows how eager the Japanese are to maintain in letter and spirit the international undertakings which came out of the Washington Conference.

The Near East

The dismemberment of Turkey which followed the close of the Great War left a situation which would obviously and inevitably breed trouble in the Near East. It will be recalled that most of European Turkey was given to Greece; a neutral Zone of the Straits took the rest of European Turkey and a strip of Asia Minor on the opposite shore of the

Hellespont, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus; Smyrna went to Greece; south of the Caucasus, the new States of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Kurdistan were set up, and these with the Mandated areas of Mesopotamia and Palestine—which went to Britain—and Syria—which went to France—and with Arabia and Egypt and Hedjaz which were struck off, all left Turkey literally but a shadow of her former self.

The Nationalist movement which followed in Turkey was inevitable. It so far has resulted in the expulsion of Greece from the Asiatic mainland, the demand by the Turks for the return of Thrace, and for various other adjustments as to the remaining parts of ex-Turkish territory. This situation led to the calling of the Conference at Lausanne which has become a political chess game for the Great European Powers, with the Turks playing first with one side and then with the other, but always with an eye single to Turkey's final advantage.

The present situation appears to be that after the Allies had submitted a proposed treaty under circumstances that made it virtually an ultimatum, France, without consulting her associates or advising them of her intentions, sent a note to the Turks announcing France's willingness to negotiate further at such time and place as suited the Turk. The Turk has thus seemingly approached very near

to the purpose of all his diplomacy—the breaking of the understanding among the Allies.

Many reasons may be advanced for this action of France. Among those which may have been most persuasive were her desire to retaliate against Britain for the latter's failure to approve the occupation of the Ruhr; a desire to avoid any war in the Near East at this time while she is fully occupied in Germany, because the termination of such a war to which she might not be a full party might cost her some of her present holdings or advantages there; and a wish to supplant Britain as the dominant Christian power among the Moslems.

At the beginning of the Lausanne Conference Turkey seemingly followed Russia's lead; later she broke away, on the assumption it seems that Russia after all was working for Russia. The latest press news is that Russia and Turkey have concluded a treaty by which Russia agrees to aid Turkey in any war she may have with Great Britain.

Of course if we had yielded to the wishes of Lloyd George and the French Government and had taken on the policing of Armenia with some 250,000 or 500,000 men, or whatever number it might take, we should now be in the midst of a very difficult situation, for a Turk and a Russian unafraid of the British Empire and France and Italy, might not have been frightened by our scowl. We should probably

have been compelled to use force; and that once applied, no one could see the end.

It seems hardly likely, however, that Turkey will actually fight Britain or any of the Great Powers, save in the unlikely situation of being furnished abundant armament by some of such Powers; for modern armament including poison gas, makes mere numbers of men more or less negligible, and Turkey has not and cannot make in any considerable or sufficient quantity, modern armament. Russia would hardly let go of much of her armament until the Western European situation clears. So it is not improbable that the Turks are in the last analysis merely bluffing and pushing their cause to the very last point, short of actual fighting.

A Paris paper is quoted as saying in reference to France's action at Lausanne,—

“ . . . we tell the Turks that the Treaty we handed them yesterday is not our last word—that France who has given up too much, is ready to yield still more.

“At the same time, we denounce England because of her audacity in maintaining a few of her demands. It seems we wish to establish as masters in the Orient the Turks, allies of the Bolsheviki who are the allies of Germany. Certainly the Turks are not the biggest fools in this affair.”

A British paper speaks of the action of France as a "desertion of France in the Near East."

The really serious part of the whole Near Eastern situation is that the arrogance of the Turk must inevitably produce a sympathetic reaction among all Moslems. A striking Turkish success either in diplomacy or on the field of battle against the great powers or any one of them will, it is reasonably certain, inflame the whole Moslem world, and if it be a success in arms that shall impel the Moslem forward, the loss of human life before matters become again quiet is appalling to consider.

Europe

There are four elements in the present political situation of Europe, which we may note:—*First*—the alliance between France and England has a background of so many centuries of hostility between the two nations, and dislikes if not hatreds between the two peoples, that the preservation of the alliance between them in the absence of a great danger common to both of them will be most difficult.

Secondly—Britain's fundamental policy for generations has been to prevent the building up in Europe of a great dominating military power. In the Napoleonic era she joined the German States to curb militaristic France; in 1914, she joined France to curb the united, ag-

gressive, belligerent German States. This principle explains seeming inconsistencies in British policy; it has a direct relation to any effort by any nation at any time to become a dominating military power on the continent of Europe.

Thirdly—the intense hatred which by all the signs Germany has for France and France has for Germany. Hate yields only to the most patent, immediate, and imperative necessity. No condition can be stable where such intense hatred exists, particularly if either party feels it is aggrieved.

Fourthly—the essential need of Britain for foreign markets.

None of these, but the last, are actually material things—they are neither men nor money, and yet they may be found to be among the decisive factors of the whole European situation.

To them may be added, the hungry maw of the Russian Bear,—hungry for the old Polish dominions, hungry for the new states, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania which the so-called peace adjustments carved out of her side, and really hungry for control of the Straits of the Bosphorous and the Hellespont, and, perhaps, hungry for a part of the Moslem world.

So far as Italy is concerned she must try, as a matter of life and death, to be with the winning side in any new conflict in Europe.

As against Germany none of the smaller middle European States will be likely to engage in actual hostilities for some time to come; they have too many German subjects and sympathizers within their borders.

So far as the United States is concerned, except under circumstances which would be cataclysmal, it is not possible to conceive of our entering a European alliance against Great Britain; we might not fight for her, but almost certainly we shall not fight against her.

Remembering that all of the new states set up in Middle Europe by the recent peace treaties are weak, perhaps internally unstable; that none of them, perhaps all of them combined, could not protect itself or themselves unaided against the aggression of any first-class power, and none of them able certainly to protect themselves against a strong, stable, armed second-rate power; remembering that they were set up as the result of the territorial curtailment of Russia, Germany, and Austria; that France stands as to Poland, (which is to be a buffer state between Germany and Russia) the prime protector if not the responsible creator; that France has been considered the most consistent enemy of the Bolsheviki and friend of the Russian monarchists; that there is a reputed alliance or at least rapprochement between Germany and Russia, which latter is said now to have the second largest and best equipped European army, German armed and

partly officered; and that as between Turkey and Germany if it should come to that—Russia is not likely to hesitate in the event even of some understanding between Turkey and France,—remembering these things, you have a picture which does not promise peace from French occupation of German territory. The question of peace or war, may be found to be a question not of men, nor of finance, nor of food, but merely of armament.

Thus Europe seems upon the threshold of a new upheaval, the results of which no one can foresee.

The Americas

So far as Latin America is concerned, it need not now be considered in any consideration of world politics.

So far as Canada is concerned, she will in all probability follow the fortunes of Great Britain.

So far as the United States is concerned, it does seem as if the present situation in Europe, with its rival interests, and rival ambitions, with a situation pregnant with the possibilities of a break between those who would have been our allies if we had fully executed the Treaty of Versailles, all demonstrate the infinite wisdom behind our nation-old policy of keeping clear of Europe's politics. We have exercised our *moral* suasion with France in reference to

the Ruhr; we have been participants, unofficial, in all the deliberation of the Reparations Commission where we have tried to use the voice of wisdom; our Ambassador to Italy is participating in the Conference at Lausanne. In every case we have exercised all of the persuasive powers, all of the moral influence that was at our command. We have, at critical junctures, been seconded in our efforts by the voices of other great powers. We have failed in each case, both singly and with others, to change the course of decisive events. There is one argument we have not applied, and that is the argument of force. Are we in a position where we wish to apply it,—and if we are, still are we wise enough to know in whose behalf to use it?

Finally, while we do have responsibilities and obligations in the present world situation, they are responsibilities and obligations which arise solely because we are a friend and neighbor of the suffering nations, and because, more or less, their welfare is our welfare; and this is the full sum of both our responsibilities and our obligations.

We are not responsible for the condition in Europe which has brought about the present terrible situation, except on the theory that these are the results of the defeat of Germany, and on the theory that we are responsible for that defeat. For the Great War was not of our making, nor because of our derelictions.

The War was wholly European in its making. We entered it because it assumed proportions threatening our own safety, and the perpetuity of our free institutions and perhaps of civilization.

As we have no such responsibility, neither can we owe obligations to Europe which come from the fact that we once helped them at a critical period of their history. One favor bestowed does not raise an obligation to bestow a second. We shall, of course, help Europe if we can, because we wish always to try to help the needy. But we shall make a great fundamental error if we assume or permit to be fastened upon us, a relationship of responsibility and obligation to Europe which does not and cannot exist in fact. Fundamentally Europe can recover by her own effort only.

America's Proposed Reparations Settlement

On the surface at least the reparations are the great stumbling block to European stability. Certainly every consideration calls for their final adjustment. America unofficially tried to help to a solution. Mr. Secretary Hughes, speaking at New Haven, made the following simple and wise suggestion for settling this matter. He said:

“We have no desire to see Germany relieved of her responsibility for the war or of her just obligations to make reparation for the injuries

due to her aggression. There is not the slightest desire that France shall lose any part of her just claims. On the other hand, we do *not* wish to see a prostrate Germany. There can be no economic recuperation in Europe unless Germany recuperates. There will be no permanent peace unless economic satisfactions are enjoyed. There must be hope and industry must have promise of reward if there is to be prosperity. We should view with disfavor measures which instead of producing reparations would threaten disaster.

“Some of our own people have suggested that the United States should assume the role of arbiter. There is one sufficient answer to this suggestion, and that is that we have not been asked to assume the role of arbiter. There could be no such arbitrament unless it were invited, and it would be an extraordinary and unprecedented thing for us to ask for such an invitation.

“I do not think that we should endeavor to take such a burden of responsibility. We have quite enough to bear without drawing to ourselves all the ill feeling which would result from disappointed hopes and a settlement which was viewed as forced upon nations by this country which at the same time is demanding the payment of its debts.

“But the situation does call for a settlement upon its merits. The first condition of a satisfactory settlement is that the question should be taken out of politics. Statesmen have their difficulties, their public opinion, the exigencies which they must face. It is devoutly to be hoped that they will effect a settlement among themselves, and that the coming meeting at Paris will find a solution. But if it does not, what should be done?

The alternative of forcible measures to obtain reparations is not an attractive one. No one can foretell the extent of the serious consequences which might ensue from such a course. Apart from political results, I believe that the opinion of experts is that such measures will not produce reparation payments but might tend to destroy the basis of those payments which must be found in economic recuperation.

“If, however, statesmen cannot agree and such an alternative is faced, what can be done? Is there not another way out? The fundamental condition is that in this critical moment the merits of the question, as an economic one, must alone be regarded. Sentiment, however natural, must be disregarded; mutual recriminations are of no avail; reviews of the past, whether accurate or inaccurate, promise nothing; assertions of blame on the one hand and excuses on the other come to naught.

“There ought to be a way for statesmen to agree upon what Germany can pay, for no matter what claims may be made against her, that is the limit of satisfaction. There ought to be a way to determine that limit and to provide a financial plan by which immediate results can be obtained and the European nations can feel that the foundation has been laid for their mutual and earnest endeavors to bring about the utmost prosperity to which the industry of their people entitle them.

“If statesmen cannot agree, and exigencies of public opinion make their course difficult, then there should be called to their aid those who can point the way to a solution.

“Why should they not invite men of the highest authority in finance in their respective countries—men of such prestige, experience and honor

that their agreement upon the amount to be paid, and upon a financial plan for working out the payments, would be accepted throughout the world as the most authoritative expression obtainable? Governments need not bind themselves in advance to accept the recommendations, but they can at least make possible such an inquiry with their approval and free the men who may represent their country in such a commission from any responsibility to Foreign Offices and from any duty to obey political instructions. In other words they may invite an answer to this difficult and pressing question from men of such standing and in such circumstances of freedom as will insure a reply prompted only by knowledge and conscience. I have no doubt that distinguished Americans would be willing to serve in such a commission. If Governments saw fit to reject the recommendation upon which such a body agreed, they would be free to do so, but they would have the advantage of impartial advice and of an enlightened public opinion. Peoples would be informed, the question would be rescued from assertion and counter-assertion, and the problem put upon its way to solution.

“I do not believe that any general conference would answer the purpose better, much less that any political conference would accomplish a result which Premiers find it impossible to reach. But I do believe that a small group, given proper freedom of action, would be able soon to devise a proper plan. It would be time enough to consider forcible measures after such an opportunity had been exhausted. Such a body would not only be expert but friendly. It would not be bound by special official obligations; it would have no ani-

mus and no duty but to find and state the truth. In a situation which requires an absence of technicality and immunity from interference, I hope that the way may soon be found for a frank discussion and determination of what is essentially an economic problem.

“The United States has the most friendly and disinterested purpose in this matter, and wishes to aid in any practicable way. But it is idle to make suggestions which arouse false hopes and are so impracticable that they cannot bear fruit. On the other hand, there lies open a broad avenue of opportunity if those whose voluntary action is indispensable are willing to take advantage of it. And, once this is done, the avenues of American helpfulness cannot fail to open hopefully.”

This suggestion was unacceptable to France who has preferred rather the armed occupation of more German territory. If so sane and simple a formula, so promising in its possibilities of solution, is not satisfactory, we may be led to wonder what are the underlying motives that moved its rejection.

Coming now to the main topic of our talk today, I shall proceed upon the assumption—possibly violent—that the present difficulty between France and Germany will subside and that Europe will continue to function either under the Versailles Treaty or under another treaty more or less similar to it. To attempt to unravel the intricacies of the wholly new situation which *may* come to Europe because

of the occupation of the Ruhr by France, would at this time be a highly gratuitous futility.

The subject announced for our conversation today is: "Some basic elements affecting our commercial relations with foreign countries."

It is never a simple task to get at any of the deep underlying elements of any problem, and yet no problem is ever actually solved without an adequate understanding of its fundamentals except only by a chance guess; and the issues involved in the matter of our commercial relations with foreign countries are so vast and far-reaching, so manifold and intricate, as to preclude the leaving of their solution to mere chance or guess, if anything better is possible.

That you may not be misled by a hope which will be unrealized at the end, I will say that I have no hand-made remedy for world conditions. We may view with distrust any plan which purports to be a cure. There are, however, certain elements of the situation which we may perhaps eliminate, and of course every elimination simplifies the problem. Nor do I pretend even to novelty in anything I shall say today. Much of it is the obvious. My purpose in trying briefly to cover the ground as I do, will be merely to endeavor to make sure that certain of the essentials are in mind, in connection with any conclusions that I may suggest.

A World-Problem

Our problem today is a world problem. There are those who say it is the greatest problem that ever confronted this nation, and perhaps that ever confronted the world. But I shall not attempt to say whether it be pregnant with more potential good or evil for the world, or for us, than the problem which confronted the people of our thirteen original colonies when they undertook to set up for the first time in all history, a representative Republican government under the great principles of our Constitution; or than that which faced us only three-quarters of a century later, when we removed human slavery from the midst of a nation destined to be the greatest on the face of the earth. Nor shall I attempt to balance the destinies determined at the Marne, in Flanders, and in the Argonne Forest, with those at Marathon, Salamis, Tours, Vienna, Waterloo, and Gettysburg. I wish only to observe that there have been other crises in the world's history, that they have affected relatively as large parts of the civilized world as are now affected, and that they too left the world in poverty and misery, and also in a condition of famine and disease which happily is so far a stranger to our present situation. In none of these crises was the World destroyed.

So that I am bold enough to feel that even as there was a solution which the World found

for its earlier problems, so there is a solution for this problem with which we are faced, a problem which in its shortest statement may be put,—How can the World be best led to recover its normal status and condition of peace,—how can the United States of America and its people best apply their aid and efforts to that recovery? Such is our problem.

People Must Support Measures

We may begin its consideration with the statement which will perhaps pass without serious challenge by any one, namely, that no proposed solution which contemplates a joint enterprise or action between our own government and other governments will really work out unless there is behind and supporting our government, the whole-hearted conviction, if not indeed enthusiasm, of at least a substantial majority of the people of this country. It is sheer idleness to think of the problem in other terms. What we would be trying to do in such joint measures would be of such enormous magnitude, that it could not be accomplished by any group among us however great and powerful the members of that group individually and collectively might be. So that the first essential of any solution, or (if you prefer it) in any meeting of our duty, through our own government in this present calamitous world situation, is the uniting of the people upon the proposed measure. I may further ob-

serve in passing, that one of the fundamental things in obtaining the people's support of any plan, will be a convincing of them, first, that the plan is unselfish, by which I mean, that it is not improperly onerous on Europe; and secondly, that the plan is not unduly or primarily remunerative merely to a few of us in America. Both burdens and benefits must, in reason, be evenly and widely distributed. We are becoming generally too well educated and trained for any of us to be permanently discriminated against in such matters, and the disapproval of any substantial part of us in such a matter, is too destructive to be lightly invited.

Shall America Act Alone

Another element in this situation about which there will be no quarrel is, that whatever action our Government itself takes, must be, as to Europe and the Far East at any rate, a concerted, perhaps cooperative action with other powers. We should probably waste much effort if not indeed substance, if our Government tried wholly independent measures.

But after we have disposed of these two elements, that of approval of the plan by a majority of the people of the United States and that of a concerted action with other governments—we probably have left, of the things that seem to be essential, only matters upon which

there will be more or less radical differences of opinion.

Shall Action Be Under Formal Agreements

I have just spoken of the necessity for concerted or cooperative action between us and other nations, if our Government itself is to act. One of the first questions to get out of the way in the event of concerted action, is whether we shall formally commit ourselves in advance, that is, make formal treaties, trade agreements or similar arrangements, with respect to the kind, the amount, and the manner of our cooperation, such commitments reaching out into an indefinite future—into eventualities which no man's gaze can now reach; or whether we shall leave ourselves free to move forward from time to time, as our wisdom and discretion may suggest, by arrangements and commitments made as to particular situations or as to individual enterprises and undertakings, or as to individual general measures.

In this connection we should have in mind the agreement reached at Versailles on June 28, 1919, between representatives of the United States and France (but never ratified by the United States), which provided that "the United States of America shall be bound to come immediately to her (France's) assistance, in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression against her (France) being made

by Germany". We may consider the question whether armed resistance by Germany to the present measures of France in the Ruhr region, would amount to an "unprovoked movement of aggression against" France by Germany within the meaning of that agreement, or whether such a provision would have given France a plausible basis for argument that such resistance to her occupation of the Ruhr would amount to "an unprovoked movement of aggression", and that therefore we were in honor "bound to come immediately to her assistance". If the answer is in the affirmative, then if that agreement were in force we might shortly find ourselves again sending troops to Europe, this time not to fight armies but primarily to coerce a civilian population, including women and children. Are we not today in a better position to exercise our influence in the right direction in this situation than we would have been if we were committed to participation in it? Furthermore, since Great Britain does not appear to see eye to eye with France in this situation, should we be quite prepared to proceed with France against Britain's disposition? Would the taking of sides between two allies in such a situation particularly foster and enhance our position of influence with either of them?

Or to set the question a little differently: Suppose that in 1912 the Central Powers, calling our attention to the fact that France's

forty millions of people had joined with Russia's one hundred seventy millions of people and that they two, together with Britain's four hundred fifty millions of people, had formed an entente against the Central Powers which threatened the peace and welfare of the Central Powers not only but of the entire world also; and suppose—the assumption is not over violent considering the then condition of the world and our likes and dislikes—that persuaded by such representations and impressed by such disclosures, we had made with the Central Powers, in order to protect the peace of the world as we would have said and believed, the same kind of agreement which our representatives made with France at Versailles, what then would have been our unhappy position upon the firing of that unfortunate pistol shot at Sarajevo? The German people of today believe, as they have been taught to believe, that Germany was not the aggressor in the subsequent days of that terrible Summer. What would we have believed if, as partners of Germany and seeing our interests as identical with hers, we had been bound by any such agreements? Yet in 1912, the time we have assumed for the making of such a possible arrangement, there was not in the view even of the most farseeing of men, one tithe of the dangers which every one now sees in Europe.

So that on this question either of permanent

alignments and agreements, or of temporary and particular understandings, may we not agree at least upon this point, that it is worth considering, in view of the fact that no man, and no set of men, in the whole world can foresee what the future has in store for the peoples of the world (even in broadest and dimmest outline), whether it would be wise to enter into treaties and arrangements which would bind our action, our discretion, and our wisdom, to say nothing of our interests, in those eventualities which now we cannot even guess?

American Principles of Action

America gave unstintedly her resources and sacrificed her sons when she saw a threat of world domination by a great military power. If America remains even a shadow of what she is, she will, the same necessity arising, meet in like manner, the same or an equivalent peril in the future. May wisdom not dictate that we leave ourselves wholly free to meet that peril, on whatever hand it may hereafter arise, without forcing us, in order to meet it, to violate our faith pledged in some solemn treaty?

It results that whatever measures we may concert with other powers, should not be undertaken under agreements or arrangements that commit us for an indefinite future time to an indefinite course of action.

This leads immediately to a further matter which lies among the fundamentals of our problem. International relations may be considered, for our present purpose, as being either political or commercial. It is true that in modern times, more perhaps than at any other period in the world's history, these two relations intermingle and at times coalesce; but there have always been exports to sell, imports to buy, transportation facilities to encourage and protect, and balances of trade. I suggest whether or not the present seemingly new and unique problems are so essentially different from the old ones in kind, and whether they are not rather merely differences in amounts,—in the number of places to the left of the decimal point.

Shall America Act in European Politics

Shall the possible concerted action we speak of with other powers, be extended to political matters? Perhaps we can get the problem a little more clearly in mind, if we put it this way: Assume we individuals here live in a small community of forty odd families (there are between forty and fifty independent states in the world) with as many different languages and races as families, and with different religions, arts, literatures, customs, habits, standards of living, methods of life, ethics, and above

and beyond all with fundamentally different traditions and ambitions in each of the forty families. Assume further, that in the past the more powerful of these families have forcibly absorbed other smaller families, and that they still seek to strengthen themselves by absorbing others; that in the past the absorptions have led to riots in which blood has been shed and property destroyed, and that one of the worst of these riots among the powerful families has just closed,—a riot in which we were forced to take sides in order to protect ourselves. Assume finally, that those whom we helped now wish us to enter into a partnership arrangement with them and to agree to help them in any future riots between them and our recent enemies, who are our neighbors and who promise to be our friends again, we knowing that the bitterest enmity exists between these two sets of neighbors, each having designs against the other and an intention of destroying the trade and the strength of the households of the other. But we do not know just what measures either contemplates against the other, nor that we should be in sympathy with the designs of either, nor that we approve the ends they aim against each other; and we are still vitally interested, as we ever were, in the welfare, and prosperity, and good neighborliness of all of them. Under such conditions should we enter in the blind partnership requested, the extent of our commitment being

wholly for our partner's determination, and dependent upon his needs, designs, and ambitions; or should we hold ourselves free to determine our course when the exigency arose, and in accordance with the justice of the situation and our then rights? Neither our safety nor our interest have always heretofore coincided with those of any particular neighbor.

This situation is precisely that of the United States. It is suggested on the one hand and on the other that we ally ourselves now with this country, now with that, the aims and ambitions of which we but dimly comprehend. The American people have declared recently in no unmistakable terms, their present unwillingness to abandon the oldest of our very few foreign policies, namely, the policy of no entangling alliances. Is there reason to believe that they will change their attitude? Is there a sound reason to feel that they ought to change particularly when we see the shifting and hostile interests, the possible actual breaking of good understanding between those who might have been our allies?

America's present pre-eminent political and economic position in the world comes primarily from the fact that we have not intermeddled in the various European quarrels and wars waged since the establishment of our government. We declined to ally ourselves with France at a time when our own infant

needs seemed imperatively to demand it, when France's convenience would have been aided, and when every feeling of gratitude bade us to accept it. If we had yielded at that time, and become identified with all the jealousies, intrigues, and rivalries that have cursed Europe since that time, we scarcely would have been the nation that we are today. It is in part our aloofness that has given us the power, the strength, the unchecked growth that has enabled us to perpetuate our great free institutions. It was all these that gave and that continue to give to our voice, that quality which commands the attention of the world. Make us a party to the quarrels of Europe, destroy our position of disinterested arbiter in these strifes, and may we not put an end to the very force which now gives us the power to speak to the benefit of all?

If these general considerations have merit, may we not consider as one of the fundamental elements in our problem, the question of whether our concerted effort, our working with Europe in Europe and with Europe in the Far East, shall not wisely take some other form than that of political alliances, because, in the last analysis, political alliances bind us in honor to make war for another's sake even when our own safety and welfare are but remotely involved and conceivably where these might be better secured and advantaged by the success of the other belligerent. This does not

mean we shall ignore Europe, her welfare and her safety, nor that we shall abandon the cause of civilization if it be again threatened. It merely means that we shall remain our own masters as to the occasion, the time, the means, and the quantity of our intervention in matters which generally are not our business. We have not ultimately failed in our duty in the past, we shall not in the future. It would seem we may dismiss political alliances or affiliations, or even cooperations, from our consideration.

How Best to Advance Commercial Interests

This leaves us with the problem as to how best we may advance our commercial relations with other nations, primarily because of the resulting advantage to ourselves, but secondarily for the welfare of the foreign nations themselves; because, having in mind that we produce substantially all the actual necessities of life, it takes no argument to establish that what we need to secure our own prosperity, is opportunity for sound investments and a market for the excess of what we produce over what we consume; and good permanent markets can come only from peace-pursuing, prosperous people. It is obvious therefore, that to help others to peace, prosperity, and happiness, is really to help ourselves.

The question therefore presents itself,—shall the measures which we take to increase our own prosperity, which means the finding of markets for our surplus and which in turn means prosperous purchasing nations, shall these be measures taken by and through our government, or shall they be primarily measures of private enterprise?

Paternalism in America

The question how far our government should participate in the commercial life of this nation, is one of the most difficult and important domestic questions which call for answer. Paternalism may, in strongly centralized, imperialistic governments, be wisely directed and be therefore broadly beneficial to the people living under such systems. But there is certainly a question as to how far paternalism under a government of free people, with such free institutions as we possess, would be beneficial, or, if beneficial, how far it could be carried out without the loss in freedom being far greater than the gain in gold. For after all, I may observe in passing, the material things are the dross of life. Yet this problem of aiding foreign countries to the end that they may be buyers of our surplus products, is rarely discussed without the suggestion that our Government should somehow extend aid to these countries. The most frequently

mentioned measure of relief is that of cancellation of the indebtedness of some nine and a third billions of dollars which certain of the governments of Europe owe to the government of the United States. Because this is the most mentioned and, in some respects, would be the easiest thing to do, it deserves careful consideration.

Payment of Europe's Debt

One way of aiding Europe, it may be the best way, would be, if America possessed the necessary wealth, to say to France "Here is gold enough to pay your entire foreign and domestic debt incident to the war, to rebuild your devastated areas, and completely to establish you as a prosperous people with a sound government upon a peace basis"; and then having said this to France, to say the same thing to Germany, to Austria, to Italy, to the Balkan Powers, to Russia, to Turkey, and to Great Britain. But we have not the money, and if we did have, perhaps the remedy would be of doubtful wisdom. Individual prodigal wasters of their strength and inheritance, rarely learn lessons in thrift, economy, and right living by having their debts paid as a matter of gift; and after all, nations are merely collections of individuals; and if as suggested, we paid all of the debts of Europe, and gave them funds to rebuild, reconstruct, and rehabilitate themselves, we should still leave them their hates,

their fears, their ambitions and their lusts for power and dominion; and these things and not gold are the compelling forces which direct the course of nations, and are at present the real disturbing elements of Europe.

Cancellation of Europe's Debt to Us

The nearest attainable approach to such a wholesale giving as I have suggested, is the cancellation of the debt they owe us. But there are practical domestic considerations (in addition to the broader reasons I have suggested), which make the proposal that we cancel the debt of the nine and a third billions of dollars they owe us, a matter of some difficulty. I refer to the tax situation in this country.

In examining this matter let us hold closely to the facts and not indulge in the loose vagaries of pseudo-statesmen or disappointed politicians bidding anew for popularity.

Cost of Running Our Government

The total expenditures of our country chargeable against ordinary receipts for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1922, were 3 billions 782 millions, of which 1 billion 411 millions were for payment of interest and public debt retirements for the year,—989.5 millions thereof being for interest and 422.3 millions being for debt retirement purposes. The total like

estimated expenditures for the fiscal year 1923, are 3 billions 704 millions (round numbers) of which 1 billion 430 millions are for like interest and retirements,—1 billion 100 millions being for interest and 330 millions for retirements; and the total like estimated expenditures for the fiscal year 1924, are 3 billions 180 millions, of which 1 billion 295 millions are for interest and retirements,—950 millions being for interest and 345 millions for retirements.

Senator Smoot, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, has said that for the next 25 years at least the ordinary expenditures of the government are not likely to fall below 3.5 billions per year.

None of these figures include special refunding or refinancing operations.

The highest annual expenditure of the government chargeable as ordinary expenditures, from the close of the Civil War down to and including the fiscal year ending June 30, 1914, was 735 millions, which did not include the public debt retirements which for that year amounted to approximately 27 millions, nor the postal expenditures from postal revenues.

Cost to Taxpayers of Debt Cancellation

European countries owe the United States, on account of the principal sums loaned them from the Liberty Loans floated in this country, over 9.3 billions of dollars. To serve this sum (interest and sinking fund) upon the most lib-

eral terms (25 year amortization $4\frac{1}{4}$ per cent) so far authorized by Congress in its Act of February 9, 1922 creating the foreign debt commission, would require an annual payment of 613.3 millions per year.

In addition to this 9.3 billions of dollars, European countries owe us in round numbers on account of sales of surplus war supplies 575 millions of dollars; on account of relief supplies furnished 84 millions of dollars; on account United States Grain Corporation obligations, 57 millions of dollars (round numbers); and a further sum for war supplies (subject to adjustment) of 24 millions of dollars,—a total additional sum of 740 millions of dollars. These countries also owe us on account of unpaid interest, 1 billion 554 millions of dollars. This makes a total sum, in addition to the original 9.3 billions, of 2 billions 294 millions of dollars.

Capitalizing and amortizing this last sum on the same basis as the 9.3 billions, (and this is as good as we can do on present information) we have an additional annual payment of 150.7 millions of dollars or a total annual payment of 764 millions of dollars, that is 30 millions of dollars more than the total governmental expenditures chargeable against ordinary receipts for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1914.

That is to say, and this is the all essential point in the whole matter, to forgive this European debt means (on the basis of debt re-funding thus far authorized by Congress) that

for the next twenty-five years the taxpayers of the United States must, for each of those years, pay on account of such a cancellation 30 millions of dollars per year more than the total ordinary revenue assessment made against them to run the government in the most expensive year since the Civil War and prior to the late World War. Or stated somewhat differently, to forgive this debt means that the taxpayers of this country will give to Europe every year for the next twenty-five years, 760 millions of dollars. Will the taxpayers of this country stand this, particularly in view of the fact that in certain of the countries benefiting by the cancellation, the taxes are not as heavy and have not been as they are in our own country?

If the matter be considered in the light of the terms of settlement reported to have been reached between the negotiators of Great Britain and the United States with reference to Britain's debt to us, namely a total 62 year period of amortization with interest at 3% and sinking fund at $\frac{1}{2}$ % for the first ten years, and interest at $3\frac{1}{2}$ %, and sinking fund at $\frac{1}{2}$ % for the remaining 52 years, which plan has not as yet been approved by Congress—then for each of the first 10 years on the total foreign debt of 11.6 billions of dollars the interest and sinking fund would amount to 407 millions per year, and for each of the remaining 52 years to 466 millions per year. These sums are each more

than half of our pre-war ordinary expenditures for running the government.

Will Cancellation of Debt Improve Our Foreign Trade

But it is said that to forgive this debt will greatly improve our foreign business, put it back on a pre-war level. Here again let us examine the actual facts. The total value of our combined imports and exports for 1913 was 4.278 billions of dollars,—2 billions 465 millions being exports, and 1 billion 813 millions being imports. The average total combined value of our exports and imports for the period 1904 to 1913 inclusive, ten years, was 3 billions 240 millions of dollars per year. The total combined value of exports and imports for the year ending December, 1922, was 7 billions 165 millions, (last two months estimated) of which 3 billions 869 millions were exports and 3 billions 296 millions were imports. That is to say, the total value of our combined exports and imports for the year 1922 was 2 billions 887 millions more than in 1913, and 3 billions 925 millions more than the average for the ten years immediately preceding and including 1913.

The average yearly increase for our total foreign trade from the year 1882 to 1892 (based on the actual increase or decrease in the value of trade for each year in comparison with the previous year) was 2.5 per cent; from

the year 1892 to 1902, it was on the same basis 2.35 per cent; from 1902 to 1912, it was 5.57 per cent. The average increase for the 15 years from 1900 to 1914 inclusive was 5.64 per cent. The average increase from 1882 to 1912 inclusive (30 years) was 3.48 per cent.

Based upon the value of our total foreign trade in 1913 (which was the largest in our whole history up to that time and 10.92 per cent larger than our trade in 1912) the total value of our trade in 1922 estimated upon the normal thirty year annual percentage of increase (3.48 per cent) should have been 5 billions 619 millions or 1 billion 546 millions less than our actual trade.

At the average percentage of increase ruling our foreign trade during the seven years 1907 to 1913 inclusive, namely 5.6 per cent our total foreign trade based upon the total values of 1913, would have been 6 billions 435 millions or 730 millions less than the actual trade.

But since prices are higher now than in 1913, these money values may not quite reflect the true situation; some further light may be shed by considering quantities so far as is possible. Taking the Tables given in the National City Bank Letter for June, 1922, showing the average price per pound for 1913 and for 1921 (the 1922 prices are given only for 2 months) of 31 principal exports and of 25 principal imports arranged under the headings "Principal Foodstuffs", "Manufacturing Material", and "Man-

ufactures", and dividing the average price per pound given in the Tables into the values I have given for the years 1913 and 1921 respectively, we have the following:—

In 1913 we exported 153.1 billions of pounds, and in 1921, 181.5 billions of pounds, a gain of 18%; in 1913 we imported 31.8 billions of pounds and in 1921 we imported 38.4 billions of pounds, a gain of 20%. This computation is of course not exact because I have used 1921 prices and amounts which were lower than 1922 prices, and probably amounts; but the result suggests the true situation covering our foreign trade for 1922.

As to our balance of trade between exports and imports, the average for ten years (1904 to 1913 both inclusive) shows our imports were 74% of our exports; for 1913, 73% of our exports; for 1920, 64% of our exports, this being the year of the greatest foreign trade in our history (over 13 billions of dollars); and for 1922, 85% of our exports.

In the face of these facts, how criminally uninformed or else how insincere and dishonest do those appear who howl that economically we have isolated ourselves from Europe. Is there any business man or group of business men in the whole United States that has not tried for the past four years and is not trying now to find every possible way of trading with Europe? The difficulty has never been with our disposition to trade nor with our supply of

trading materials. The real trouble has been—and let us meet it squarely—that Europe has spent and is spending so much on her military equipment that she has no money left to buy anything but the most urgent necessities. No matter what we do—short of giving them our produce—or how we plan, our peace trade will surely suffer till they stop wasting their resources preparing for war and conquest and settle down to the pursuits of peace. The fault for the world's condition does not lie at our door.

Business Necessary to Offset Cancellation of Debt

But assume that the cancelling of this European debt would increase our foreign business, how much must that business increase in order to equal to us the cost of cancelling? Of course as the taxes we would pay for cancellation would be actual out of pocket expenditures to us, we must, in order to be made whole, receive in return actual profits put back into our pockets; that is, the question is not merely gross business, but profits from business.

It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to tell what amount of profit there is in a dollar of foreign business either export or import. But to be liberal let us assume that the average net profit we realize on our total export and import business is 15% of the gross business. Then to put into our pockets the 760 millions of dollars

which we must pay out each year as a result of the cancellation of our foreign debt, would require a total additional foreign business of over 5 billions of dollars, that is our foreign business must increase in value almost 100% on the 1922 values, and, at the same prices almost 100% on the 1913 and 1921 quantities. Of course there is probably little hope or prospect of any such great increase in the immediate future.

But it is said that if these debtor countries did not have to pay us this service on their loans, they would spend at least that additional sum with us, and this, amounting to three-quarters of a billion of dollars per year, would help. This would be a good argument, as far as it goes, if these debtor countries had been and were now paying the service on their loans; but as Great Britain is the only one making any pretense at serving its loans with us, and as France (the principal debtor except Great Britain) has officially advised us they "desire to postpone for an indefinite period consideration of the matter," even this argument is of no value.

Thus unless we are prepared, as American taxpayers, to pay for the next twenty years three-quarters of a billion of dollars a year, with no reasonable chance for any substantial part of it to find its way back into our pockets for at least a considerable number of years to

come, we shall do well to consider carefully this question of debt cancellation.

Debtor Nations Not Bankrupt

Furthermore, it is to be remembered that these great debtor nations are not bankrupt. They have plenty of assets. France for example stands at practically pre-war level in population and national wealth, without counting the large acquisitions in colonial territory which she, in common with Great Britain and Italy, acquired at the end of the war and for which no monetary credit was allowed to Germany by any of them, on any account. Moreover some have considerable revenues, but they prefer to spend these in other ways than paying their debts. Finally it would seem that none of the great Allied powers, Great Britain alone excepted who has exceeded every one else in her imposition of taxes, is levying the per capita taxes we levy, and none of them is balancing its budget. Should we levy on ourselves a tax to meet their debts until at least their tax levies and economies equal our own?

Europe's Total Debt to United States

It may be further observed that in addition to the 11.6 billions of dollars which European governments owe our government as I have already explained, there are immense quantities of European government bonds (not counting

municipal and industrial bonds) in the hands of private American investors.

At the outbreak of the war there were listed on the New York Stock Exchange about 165 millions of European securities; during the period from August 1, 1914 until March 1, 1917, when our government began the lending of money, there were 1 billion 300 millions of European securities put out in America through private issue (less known redemptions); and since the war, that is between November 11, 1918 and December 31, 1922, there have been privately issued here about 884 millions of dollars.

This makes Europe's present total debt to us in round numbers say 14 billions of dollars which takes no account of current credit balances for merchandise including gold and silver which will add probably another billion dollars at least.

Thus the problem of lending money to Europe is perhaps not a casual business operation to be considered *en bloc*, but rather a matter for serious consideration and study for each individual project presented.

Further Government Loans to Europe

I am assuming that on the facts it may not be seriously contended that our government should itself make further loans to or on account of foreign governments because what our government loans it must borrow from the

people, and what it borrows from them, it must tax them to pay back. We may well consider whether any plan for financing Europe or our trade with Europe which involves the increasing of our taxes, is worthy of serious consideration. We, as individuals, are already tax-ridden almost beyond endurance—far more heavily as I have said than some of the countries who clamor for our charity. The business of the country is likewise overburdened. There is complaint in some quarters that our present tariff is unwise, even iniquitous; it is estimated to produce 450 millions of dollars in 1923, and 425 millions in 1924, the largest amounts raised by customs in our entire history. Yet if this amount of revenue is not raised in this way, how shall it be raised; and in this connection we will remember that our total revenues for 1922 fell off from those of 1921, by 30.4%, and yet that we must raise for ordinary expenditures in 1923 the total sum (estimated) of 3 billions 703 millions of dollars, and for 1924 the total sum (estimated) of 3 billions 180 millions. This is the overhead and must be met.

It is also to be remembered that we have lost by the prohibition act a revenue that in 1919 totaled 483 millions. This revenue must of course be replaced by other revenue.

Furthermore, to meet the requests of business men and the needs of business, the excess profits tax has been removed, thereby cutting

off another revenue that in 1918 yielded 2 billions; in 1920, 2 billions (estimated); in 1921, 1 billion 250 millions (estimated); and in 1922, 800 millions. This loss of revenue must be made up from some other source.

I may add that, to meet the situation, resulting from this continuous loss of revenue, the administration has not been idle. It has curtailed the ordinary expenditures of the government from 6 billions 141 millions in 1920, to 4 billions 891 millions in 1921, and to 3 billions 618 millions in 1922, the expenditures for 1921, and 1922 including 422 millions each year for retirements of the public debt, an item not covered in the expenditures for 1920. The civil and miscellaneous expenditures of 1920 were cut almost in half in 1921, and that reduction was in turn cut almost in half in 1922.

Plans for General Financing

Again I say that in the face of these facts, it may perhaps well be thought *mass* financing of these foreign governments by our own government is fundamentally unsound and unwise, if not impossible. And speaking of *mass* financing I ought to refer to the two projects therefor which were made in Europe but which come to nothing. The first was the *Ter Meulen* plan which took its name from its Dutch originator, and which provided for the issuance of bonds by the respective governments of those European countries im-

porting goods, the bonds so issued to be used by the individual importer of the particular country as a collateral security by the importer with the foreign exporter from whom he bought his goods, provision being made for the selling of the bonds by the exporter in case the importer defaulted. This plan had the earnest support of the League of Nations, but failed because seemingly the importing nations it was designed to help were unwilling to guarantee their nationals who were importing.

The second was the formation of a world International Finance Corporation, projected at a meeting of International bankers at Paris in December, 1921, approved by the Supreme Council at Cannes in January, 1922, and studied by a Special Committee at a meeting in London the following February. This project first contemplated the organization of a \$100,000,000 corporation the capital to be subscribed (as it appears) by France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the United States, and Germany, Holland and Belgium to have the right to participation also. This capital was to be used as a sort of revolving fund. Later it was decided to organize instead of one great international corporation, several constituent national corporations, one in each of the participating countries, each national corporation to have behind it the guarantee of its own government. For a variety of reasons, this plan also failed.

It seems neither unkind nor unfair to say that various of the plans proposed have, as their basic idea, that America shall, to speak in slang phrase, "hold the bag", and that so soon as it becomes apparent America will not assume that role, the plan loses both its value and its appeal.

But my time has gone. I am quite aware that it may be charged my observations lead largely to negative conclusions; but I may plead in reply that to know what not to do is the next best thing to knowing what should be done.

It does seem to me that we may safely assert the world to be in such condition that no financial juggler can merely wave his magic wand, saying, "Presto! Change!", and have that world suddenly become a peaceful, well meaning, unselfish, prosperous community of affectionate neighbors knowing no law but the golden rule. An upset world has never been so righted; it probably never will be while man is what he is. World recovery is probably a slow, painful, painstaking progress, dependent in part at least upon good neighborliness and a practice of what are sometimes termed the Christian virtues. The problem is not, let it be always remembered, merely nor perhaps primarily one of finance; it has to deal with the imponderables but yet the actualities, of hate, fear, ambition, selfishness, greed, and the lust of power and dominion. Put these out of

it, and the world will soon right itself; but they remain, seemingly unslaked.

How American Business Man May Help Europe

What can we as American business men do to help restore the world? We can, individually and in groups and pending the time when the mists lift a bit and we are able to see more clearly our way, examine with care and with sympathy, every serious proposal coming to us from war-impooverished countries. That good understanding may be encouraged, we should see that every project which is undertaken shall be so worked out that profits coming from it shall be shared with the foreign initiator. We shall probably find it wise to require that they shall contribute as partners, a portion of the capital behind the enterprise. It seems we may safely engage, on such a basis, in works of restoration of devastated areas in Europe, and in the construction of public works and in the establishment of industries and transportation systems and facilities, both in Europe and elsewhere, particularly in the British Colonies, in Latin America, and, in due time, in the Far East. We may also provide cooperative plans for promoting trade (imports and exports) between ourselves and foreign countries.

In other words, the material recovery of the world is probably a matter not of inspired high

finance, but of slow, sound business development, to which we are by habit accustomed and in which we are trained. We must be prepared to accumulate profits a little more slowly than we had hoped, or probably than we have been accustomed. Sound business care and principles, reasonable foresight, patience, are probably the essential things we need. If we will forget war-time so-called prosperity, and look oftener at the pre-war returns, we shall perhaps be happier and get along better.

On the other hand, some of the more selfish of us Americans may with propriety, and perhaps with advantage, cease scheming to find some way by which we may further involve our own government in the troubles of the world, for our own profit. The temper of our own people makes such a course dangerous to so-called "capital", even if it were practicable.

Finally, we should never forget we are Americans with the greatest and best government on earth, and that the perpetuation for the world of the great free institutions set up by our Constitution is infinitely more important and more valuable to us and to the world, than the wealth of a myriad of Indies.

I can think of no better way to finish our conversation of today than to quote from a statement made by Mr. Otto H. Kahn on December 12, 1922, as follows:

"The easy days are gone. The fact that they are gone should, I believe, be welcomed rather than lamented, because the discipline of harder tasks is good for a democracy and good for the fibre of the race.

"Now we are confronted with new situations, new movements, new tendencies, new problems. We are living in a portentous time, big with the destiny of the world, for good or ill, for many years to come. It challenges the capacity of the American people to play worthily the part which the turn of events has made theirs.

"We must give more serious thought than heretofore to matters of general import and national concern. We must increasingly get together, we men and women of different occupations and viewpoints and from different sections, and find out what is wise and right and making for the progress of the country and the welfare of all. We must take the pains and the time to formulate reasoned convictions, and have the courage to stand up for them.

"We must not shirk the burden of leadership for America. Our collective responsibility, as well as the individual responsibility of every American, is heavy in the face of the times.

"Nearly sixty years ago, President Lincoln addressed these words to Congress:

"You cannot, if you would, be blind to the signs of the times. I beg of you a calm and enlarged consideration of them, ranging, if it may be, far above personal and partisan politics. . . . So much good has not been done, by one effort, in all past time as, in the Providence of God, it is now your high privi-

lege to do. May the vast future not have to lament that you have neglected it."

"That noble invocation applies today. We dare not hope that a leader will arise comparable to the immortal American who uttered it, but, in going to meet the problems before us, we may and should seek guidance and inspiration from his wisdom, vision and steadfastness, from his tolerance, kindliness and forbearance."

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